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I. INTRODUCTION

In nonemergency situations medical and legal ethics stipulate that
physicians may begin treatment only with a patient's consent.1 But
what of the case of the terminally ill patient who, due to age, illness,
or mental retardation is incapable of consenting to potentially painful, non-life saving treatment? The question is not far-fetched; doctors caring for the critically ill frequently encounter this uncomfortable dilemma.2
1. Relman, The Saikewicz Decision: Judges as Physicians, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 508
(1978).
The common law of every state prohibits doctors from administering medical treatment
without the patient's informed consent. Cantor, Quinlan,Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RTrrGERS L. REV. 243, 248 (1977). Numerous states have specific
medical consent statutes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.46 (1983).
"Good Samaritan" Acts enacted in many states relieve medical personnel of liability when
they act in good faith in an emergency situation. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.13 (1983).
2. Note, The "Living Will": The Right to Death With Dignity?, 26 CASE W. RES. 485, 486
(1976). If the doctor ignores specific desires expressed by a patient and administers unwanted
treatment without consent, he may be civilly and criminally liable for assault and battery. Id.
See, e.g., Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A ProsecutorialView of the Quinlan Case, 30
RUTGERS L. REv. 304, 305 (1977). For a discussion of involuntary passive euthanasia constitut-
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Recent advances in medical science have fostered this predicament by dramatically increasing a person's average life expectancy.8
In addition, technology has created machines capable of keeping a
patient "alive" long after death.4 Medical decisionmaking is further
complicated by the patient's desire to exert personal control over
medical destiny and an upsurge of interest in "death with dignity."5
Many people, fearing a long and protracted death, have asserted
their "right to die" by executing a document known as a "living will."
The "living will" instructs physicians to allow death if no reasonable
chance of recovery exists.' This marked preference for natural death7
ing homicide, see Sanders, Euthanasia:None Dare Call it Murder, 60 J. CRIM. L. 351 (1969),
but see Elkington, The Dying Patient,the Doctor and the Law, 13 VIL. L. REV. 740 (1968)
(claiming that a person is no longer a human being when he has lost his ability to maintain a
conscious, reasoning state).
3. See STATITICAL ABsTRAcT oF Tn UNITED STATES 1984 at 73 (104th ed.).
4. Technical advances in medicine now permit maintenance and support of cardiac and
respiratory function in man long after massive or even total destruction of the brain occurs.
Zimring, Medical Judgment v. Court Imposed Rules; In Treatment of Terminally Ill Patients,
81 N.Y. ST. J. MsD. 951 (1981). An unconscious patient may therefore be rushed to the emergency room after cardiac arrest and be placed on machines which will save his "life" but leave
him with a brain severely and irreversibly damaged. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of
Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible
Coma, 205 J. A.M.A. 337, 339 (1968). See generally Note, Involuntary Passive Euthanasiaof
Brain-Stem-DamagedPatients: The Need for Legislation-An Analysis and a Proposal, 14
SAN DiGo L. REv. 1277 (1977).
Florida has statutorily recognized brain death and relieved all medical personnel of liability when a "brain dead" determination is made in compliance with this provision. FLA. STAT. §
382.085 (1983).
5. Commentators have noted a growing interest in death among the American public. See
E. KUBLER-RosS, ON DEATH AND DYING 11-12 (1969); see, e.g., Euthanasiaand the Care of the
Dying, DILEMMAS or EUTHANASiA 1, 10, 12-14 (J. Behnke & S. Bok, eds. 1975); R.VEATCH,
DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGIcAL REVOLUTION 17 (1976). This increased interest has resulted
in a united effort by physicians to formally recognize the patient's right to participate in treatment decisions. See G. ANNAs, THE RIGHTS oF HosPrrAL PATIRrs: THE BAsIc ACLU GumE TO
A HosPrrAL PATIENT's RIGHTs 4 (1975); Mills, On Death and Dying Laws, J. LEGAL MED. Aug.
1977, at 3.
6. Note, supra note 2, at 485. A "living will" is a document, similar to a will, executed by
a person during his lifetime which sets forth his desires concerning medical treatment in contemplation of illness or death. Note, In re Living Will, 5 NovA L.J. 455, 445 n.1 (1981). In the
past twelve years, more than six million copies of living wills have been sent to the public
pursuant to their request. 6 CONCERN FOR DYING NEwsLTTra 2 (Spring 1980). In addition,
periodicals assert the need for natural death legislation. See, e.g., Akers, The Living Will: Already a PracticalAlternative, 55 Tax. L. REv. 665 (1977); Kutner, The Living Will: Coping
with the HistoricalEvent of Death, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 39 (1975); Note, Rejection of Extraordinary Medical Care by a Terminal Patient: A Proposed Living Will Statute, 64 IowA L. REV.
573 (1979); Note, The Right to Die: A Proposalfor NaturalDeath Legislation, 49 U. CIN. L.
REv. 228 (1980).
The Euthanasia Education Council distributes a Model Living Will, which states:
TO MY FAMILY, MY PHYSICIAN, MY LAWYER, MY CLERGYMAN TO ANY
MEDICAL FACILITY IN WHOSE CARE I HAPPEN TO BE TO ANY INDIVIDUAL
WHO MAY BECOME RESPONSIBLE FOR MY HEALTH, WELFARE OR AFFAIRS
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over mechanically extended life has created agonizing legal, medical
and ethical problems for the health care profession and the judiciary.
The problem is acute when an incompetent' patient has previously
executed a natural death directive. It is here that current law is most
confused.
Courts addressing the issue have acknowledged that a competent
individual's right of privacy includes the right to be free of bodily
invasion. 9 Yet, these courts have not recognized an incompetent's
right against such bodily intrusion. Florida, for example, specifically
differentiates between these two patient classes. Though a competent
patient may effect his right to die under Florida law without judicial
interference, 10 an incompetent patient must obtain court approval
through a guardian before termination of extraordinary medical care
is allowed.1" Such judicial intervention is required despite the incomDeath is as much a reality as birth, growth, maturity and old age-it is the one
certainty of life. If the time comes when I, can no longer take part in decisions for
my own future, let this statement stand as an expression of my wishes, while I am still of
sound mind.
If the situation should arise in which there is no reasonable expectation of my recovery from physical or mental disability, I request that I be allowed to die and not be kept
alive by artificial means or "heroic measures." I do not fear death itself as much as the
indignities of deterioration, dependence and hopeless pain. I, therefore, ask that medication be mercifully administered to me to alleviate suffering even though this may hasten
the moment of death.
This request is made after careful consideration. I hope you who care for me will feel
morally bound to follow its mandate. I recognize that this appears to place a heavy responsibility upon you, but it is with the intention of relieving you of such responsibility
and of placing it upon myself in accordance with my strong convictions, that this statement is made.
Signed
Date
Witness
Witness
Copies of this request have been given to:
See Dempsey, The Living Will-and the Will to Life, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 12, 26.
7. Natural death, or antidysthanasia is defined as "failure to take positive action to prolong the life of an incurable patient.
... S. SHINDELL, THE LAW IN MEDICAL PRACTIE 118
(1966). This is to be distinguished from euthanasia, defined as the taking of positive action to
end the life of an incurable patient. Id.
8. For purposes of this note, an incompetent patient refers to a patient in a vegetative or
comatose state without ability to think or reason.
9. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (4th D.C.A. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
See also Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d
417 (1977); In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168, 372 A.2d 360 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,
355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
10. Satz, 379 So. 2d 359 (F]a. 1980). See infra text accompanying notes 78-98.
11. J.F.K. Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983). See infra
text and accompanying notes 99-121.
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petent's prior execution of a living will. 12 This vague and differential
treatment of a fundamental constitutional right is, at the very least,
suspect.1 3 Furthermore, these decisions enunciate arbitrary, case specific procedures which fail to answer numerous questions concerning
the legal validity of a living will.
Until a decisive course is charted, members of the medical profession remain in legal limbo. Physicians may be forced to overtreat
some patients and undertreat others due to constant fear of costly
malpractice suits. 14 Current legal and medical confusion surrounding
the physician's duty and the incompetent's rights has precipitated a
precarious situation for the patient, the physician, and the court. In
response, Florida courts must protect an incompetent's right to privacy by recognizing the legal validity of a living will and delineating

,clearcut guidelines for its implementation.
This note examines recent judicial recognition of the terminally ill

patient's right to die. 5 While the competent patient may exercise the
right unencumbered by the judiciary, the incompetent patient must
receive judicial approval to remove life-sustaining devices. This note
submits that mandatory judicial intervention abridges the incompe-

tent's right to die. Where an incompetent has previously executed a
valid living will, courts should acknowledge this declaration without
intervention. To achieve this result, guidelines will be proposed to
facilitate the implementation of natural death legislation in Florida.
II. PRIVACY RIGHTS TO BODILY AUTONOMY

The right to be let alone is among the most zealously guarded
personal rights.1 6 This fundamental privacy right, contained in the
12 Id. Through advanced declaration, a Living Will eliminates the need to determine the
declarant's competency at the time of implementation. Such an advance decision allows the
maker time to reflect on his choice both before and after execution. This may in fact be preferable to a contemporaneous assertion of a patient's desire when critical illness has set in, since at
that time death related factors may distort competency. Note, supra note 2, at 511. See also
Gurney, Is There a Right to Die-A Study of the Law of Euthanasia,3 CuM.-SAM. L. R.v.
235, 260 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 279 (1972) (holding a Georgia abortion statute unconstitutional because it mandated committee overview of doctor/patient abortion decisions).
14. Relman, supra note 1, at 508. See also Hushen, Dilemmas in Practice:Questioning
TPN as the Answer, 1982 AM. J. NuRsiNG 852, 854. See also MacDonnell, "No Resuscitation"
Orders, 1981 CAN. MED. AJ. at 809.
15. This right is encompassed in the constitutional right of privacy. Though the Constitution does not expressly mention the privacy right, the Supreme Court has recognized this guarantee as implicit in the Bill of Rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
The Court has also attributed this protection to the fourteenth amendment. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
16. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In his
now famous dissent Justice Brandeis stated: "The makers of our Constitution.. .conferred, as
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penumbra of the Bill of Rights' guarantees, 17 extends to all people,
competents and incompetents alike.1 8 Though the Constitution does
not specifically express a right of privacy, early United States Supreme Court cases recognized an individual's right to possession and
control of his own person, free from restraint or interference, as one
of the most sacred common law rights. 9
The right to privacy was initially acknowledged in Griswold v.
Connecticut" where the Supreme Court invalidated a state statute
prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples. Writing for
the Court, Justice Douglas asserted that the amendments to the Bill
of Rights created "zones of privacy."'2 ' In his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg found the right of privacy in the ninth amendment
which required states to demonstrate a compelling interest to restrict
this right.22 Justices White and Harlan considered the statute unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment though they did not refer to "privacy" in their concurrence. 2 Thus, in recognizing this right
to privacy, the majority failed to specifically define its parameters,
24
leaving such development of a case-by-case methodology.
Less than a decade later, the Court established precedence for
broadening an individual's personal rights. In Roe v. Wade, the Court
extended the right of privacy to encompass a female's decision to terminate pregnancy in the absence of compelling state interest.25 The
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men." Id.
17. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding the right of privacy to emanate
from the guarantees of the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments).
18. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewica, 373 Mass. 728, 745, 370
N.E.2d 417, 427 (1977).
19. The Supreme Court recognized the importance of privacy values in Union Pacific R.R.
v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). The Court stated:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law
• . ."[t]he right of one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity; to be
let alone."
Id.
20. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21. Id. at 484.
22. Id. at 497.
23. Id. at 499, 502.
24. Id. at 479. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (recognizing the right of
the individual to be free unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters fundamentally affecting a person); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (holding that an individual has a
right to privacy within his home which encompasses the right to read allegedly pornographic
material).
25. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). The Court also promulgated specific guidelines for the states
to follow in allowing abortion. Id. In the first trimester, the Court found that a woman's deci-
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Roe Court recognized the mental and physical burdens of child care
and acknowledged a woman's distressful life which could result from
having an unwanted child.26 Every state that has considered the right
of a terminally ill patient to be free from bodily invasion has con27
sulted and relied upon the Roe decision.

Although the Supreme Court has not specifically extended a privacy right to terminally ill patients refusing medical treatment, the
extent of state interest in the life of a dying comatose patient can be
examined by analogy to Roe. Under Roe, the state's interest does not
become compelling until a fetus reaches viability 28 and is capable .of

meaningful autonomy outside the mother's womb.29 While Roe focuses on the preservation of "potential" life, the preservation of waning life is similar.30 In the face of imminent, inevitable death, the
state theoretically loses its interest in preserving the potential for a
return to functional life. Instead, the state adopts the same interest
in a dying patient that it has for an unviable fetus.3 1 In fact, the
state's interest may be less in the case of a dying incompetent since,
arguably, that person's meaningful life has permanently ceased.32
Thus, courts considering the terminally ill patient's right to refuse
medical treatment have assumed that constitutional privacy values
extend beyond the procreative rights identified by the Supreme
Court.33

sion to terminate her pregnancy must be absolute and freb of state intervention. In the second
trimester, the state may regulate the place and manner of abortion procedures since it has a
compelling interest in the mother's well-being due to a higher incidence of mortality after the
first trimester. In the third trimester, the state's interest in the fetus' "potential" life becomes
compelling and it may therefore prohibit abortion irrespective of the individual's desires, unless
that individual's own life is in danger. Id.
26. Id. at 153. The Court also recognized the right of a woman to avoid the stigma of
unwed motherhood. Id.
27. See cases cited infra note 122.
28. A fetus is viable, according to the Court, when it is potentially able to live outside the
mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid, usually at about seven months. Id. at 160.
29. 410 U.S. at 161.
30. Comment, Florida'sRight to Die-A Question of Litigation or Legislation?, 8 FiA.
ST. U.L. REv. 111, 119 (1980).
31. Id. As specified in Roe, the state possesses no interest in the life of an unviable fetus.
410 U.S. at 163.
32. See Wolman, Discontinuing Treatment for the Terminally Ill: Ethical Considerations, 1981 CONN. MED. J. 731, 731-32.
33. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976). See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (verifying that security from physical
intrusion bears an important relation to fundamental personal privacy); see also Scott v.
Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976) (noting that involuntary administration of drugs to hospitalized psychiatric patient could constitute deprivation of privacy); Runnels v. Rosendale, 499
F.2d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that performance of nonconsensual surgical treatment
upon a prison inmate violated constitutionally protected rights to be secure in one's own body);
see generally Cantor, Quinlan,Privacy, and the Handling'ofIncompetent Dying Patients, 30
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A. The Quinlan Landmark-An Incompetent's Right to Die
With the decision In re Quinlan,-4 New Jersey was the first state
to extend Roe to include a privacy right to natural death. After
twenty-two year old Karen Quinlan became comatose, physicians determined she would never again lead a cognitive life. 5 Karen's father
petitioned for appointment as guardian ad litem to obtain authority
to cease the extraordinary medical procedures keeping Karen alive.36
The Quinlan court held that, under certain circumstances, the
fundamental right of personal privacy as described in Griswold and
Roe encompassed a patient's decision to decline medical treatment.3 7
Furthermore, the court found "no thread of logic" existed to prevent
extending that right to an incompetent.38 Thus, Karen's private right
to terminate her non-cognitive life could not be discarded simply because her debilitated condition prevented a conscious exercise of that
right. 9 Accordingly, the court next focused on the manner in which a
grossly incompetent Karen could implement her right to discontinue
treatment.40
L. REv. 243, 246 (1977).
34. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
35. Id. at 25; 355 A.2d at 655. Although Karen was not "brain dead," she was comatose
and suffered from decortication, a condition relative to brain derangement. Id. at 24, 355 A.2d
at 654. Karen was placed on a respirator to assist her in breathing. Id.
36. Id. at 53, 355 A.2d at 670. The court ruled that Karen's father was a suitable guardian, and that the appointed guardian could choose attending physicians. Id. at 53-54, 355 A.2d
at 670-71. Mr. Quinlan sought only termination of the respiration device and apparently had no
intention of seeking to discontinue any other life-sustaining treatment such as antibiotics and
intravenous feeding. See N.Y. Times, May 29, 1976, § 1, at 20, col. 5.
37. Quinlan,70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. The court stated that this right enunciated in
Griswold is presumably "broad enough" to allow refusal of treatment "in much the same way
as it is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain
conditions." Id.
38. Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
39. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. The court found that since:
RUTGERS

[A] putative decision by Karen to permit this non-cognitive, vegetative existence to terminate by natural forces is regarded as a valuable incident of her right of privacy, as we
believe it to be, then it should not be discarded solely on the basis that her condition
prevents her conscious exercise of the choice.
Id. The court distinguished this situation from its earlier decision in John F. Kennedy Mem.
Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971). There a severely injured woman attempted
to resist blood transfusions and surgery due to religious beliefs. The court found the woman to
be apparently "savable to long life and vibrant health;-a situation not at all like the present
case." Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
40. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at at ,1, 355 A.2d at 664. The court stated:
Our affirmation of Karen's independent right of choice, however, would ordinarily be
based upon her competency to assert it. The sad truth, however, is that she is grossly
incompetent and we cannot discern her supposed choice based on the testimony of her
previous conversations with friends, where such testimony is without sufficient probative
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Seeking the least burdensome procedure, the court permitted
Karen's family to exercise its best judgment as to whether Karen, if
capable, would reject extraordinary medical treatment. If, according
to their substituted judgment," Karen would choose to die naturally,
the life-support systems could be removed. Before exercising such
judgment, however, the court required family consultation with a
hospital ethics committee and a medical determination that the comatose condition would continue.42 In formulating this procedure,
the court specifically rejected any requirement of judicial intervention in natural death decisions. The court recognized that judicial intervention would be an inappropriate encroachment upon the medical profession's field of competence.43
B. Extensions of Quinlan-The Doctrine of Substituted Judgment
Massachusetts first examined the passive euthanasia issue shortly
after New Jersey's Quinlan decision. In Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz," the elderly incompetent resided in a state mental health facility and suffered from severe
mental retardation and leukemia.45 With an I.Q. of ten and a mental
age of less than three years, he was unable to understand his fatal
illness. 46 Though chemotherapy was the accepted form of treatment,

it offered no cure, and at best, only a thirteen month chance of
remission.47
weight.
Id.
41. The substituted judgment doctrine allows an incompetent patient's guardian to assert
the patient's personal subjective right of privacy, if in the guardian's opinion, that patient
would so assert it. See id.
42. If the right of privacy in treatment termination cases is analogous to abortion cases,
then use of an ethics committee may be constitutionally suspect according to the Supreme
Court's decision in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1979). See Comment, supra note 30, at 121.
43. Quinlan,70 N.J. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669. See Relman,The Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 Am.J.L. MaD. 233, 235 (1978). Relman strongly disagrees with judicial resolution of natural death decisions, claiming that such a policy violates both common sense and
clinical tradition and will result in serious problems such as prolongation of suffering. He therefore suggests that judicial input occur only when there is disagreement concerning treatment
among next of kin or when a complaint is brought by a relevant party. Id.
44. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
45. Id. at 729, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
46. Id. at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420. Saikewicz was diagnosed as having acute myeloblastic
leukemia. Id. at 729, 370 N.E.2d at 419. Because Saikewicz could communicate only by grunts
and gestures, he was unable to indicate whether he was experiencing pain. Id. at 731, 370
N.E.2d at 420.
47. Id. at 732, 370 N.E.2d at 420. Even when administered, chemotherapy had only a 30%
to 40% chance of causing remission of the disease. Id. at 753-55, 370 N.E.2d at 431-32. Furthermore, evidence indicated that there were toxic side effects to the treatment which included
"pain and disconfort,. . increased chance of infection, possible bladder irritation, and possible
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Because Saikewicz was unable to give informed consent to treatment, the facility's superintendent petitioned the probate court to
appoint a guardian ad litem authorized to make necessary medical
decisions using "substituted judgment. '48 Comparing the rights of
competent patients with those of incompetent patients, the court
found the two classes possessed equivalent privacy rights based on
the value of human dignity.49 To decide otherwise would "downgrade
the status of the incompetent person by placing a lesser value on his
intrinsic worth and vitality." 50 The majority cited Quinlan to support
its conclusion that the right of privacy encompassed Saikewicz' right
5
to avoid unwanted infringment of his bodily integrity. 1
In analyzing how Saikewicz could exercise this right to privacy,
the Massachusetts court followed Quinlan and adopted a substituted
judgment test.52 The court, however, diverged from the Quinlan proloss of hair." Id. at 734, 370 N.E.2d at 421. Administration of the treatment would require
Saikewicz' cooperation, yet doctors testified that his incompetent condition would mandate forcible restraint to prevent his tampering with intraveneous devices. Such restraint could increase
pain and cause further complications such as penumonia. Id. at 734 n.5, 370 N.E.2d at 421 n.5.
48. Id. at 729, 370 N.E.2d at 419. The court states its basis for using substituted judgement in a footnote:
In arriving at a philosophical rationale in support of a theory of substituted judgment in the context of organ transplants from incompetent persons, Professor Robertson
of the University of Wisconsin Law School argued that "maintaining the integrity of the
person means that we act toward him 'as we have reason to believe [he] would choose for
[himself] if [he] were [capable] of reason and deciding raitonally.' It does not provide a
license to impute to him preferences he never had or to ignore previous preferences ...
If preferences are unknown, we must act with respect to the preferences a reasonable,
competent person in the incompetent's situation would have." Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 48, 63
(1976), quoting J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 209 (1971). In this way, the "free choice
and moral dignity" of the incompetent person would be recognized. "Even if we were
mistaken in ascertaining his preferences, the person [if he somehow became competent]
could still agree that he had been fairly treated, if we had a good reason for thinking he would have made the choices imputed to him." Robertson, supra at 63.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 750-51 n.15, 370 N.E.2d at 430 n.15.
49. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 728, 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424 (1977). The court also recognized
the "unwritten constitutional right of privacy found in the penumbra of specific guarantees of
the Bill of Rights." Id. The trend in the law has been to give incompetent person the same
rights as other individuals. Boyd v. Registrars of Voters of Belchertown, 368 Mass. 632, 334
N.E.2d 629 (1975).
50. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at '147, 370 N.E.2d at 428.
51. Id. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424 (1977), (citing In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A-2d 657,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)). See, e.g., Reddington v. Clayman, 334 Mass. 244, 134 N.E.2d
920 (1956) (holding defendant in malpractice suit who performs nonconsensual surgery liable
for at least nominal damages due to invasion of privacy). See generally Cantor, A Patient's
Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation

of Life, 26
52.

RUTGE S

L. REv. 228 (:1973).

Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at '750, N.E.2d at 430 (1977).
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cedure for implementing this test.5 3 Unlike Karen, Saikewicz had al-

ways been incompetent and had never possessed the ability to make
known his personal preference for life or death. For this reason, the
court decided Saikewicz's choice could best be made by the judiciary.5 4 This judicial intervention requirement subsequently generated
enormous concern among the Massachusetts medical guild. Uncertain
about possible liability for removal of life-sustaining equipment, physicians sought judicial approval of even routine medical decisions. 55
Recently, however, the Massachusetts Supreme Court clarified its
stance concerning the need for judicial involvement in substituted
judgment cases.56 Presently, court approval is required only where no
caring family members are available to substitute their judgment on
behalf of the incompetent, or where the patient has never been able
to express his preference for life or death. Since the incompetent
patient who has previously executed a valid living will5" has articu53. Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435 (1977). But see Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and
Saikewicz: DecisionMaking for the Terminally Ill-Incompetent, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 367 (1979).
Annas attacks the assumption that Saikewicz, by virtue of its judicialization approach, directly
contradicts Quinlan. Id. at 371-85. According to his proposition, the Quinlan court simply
viewed Quinlan's situation as one in which a hopeless medical prognosis left no doubt that
Karen would have chosen death. The Saikewicz court, on the other hand, possessed legitimate
doubt as to the patient's true desires, doubt that could best be resolved through adversary
proceedings. Id. at 375-76. Together, the Quinlan and Saikewicz decisions delineate, in Annas'
view, the appropriate spheres of medical and legal decision making. Id. at 384. 54. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435 (1977). According to the court, such
questions of life and death required the process of detached but passionate investigation and
decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of government was created. Id. The
Saikewicz holding has been roundly criticized in the medical community. See, e.g., Reiman,
supra note 43.
55. See In the Matter of Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978). Sixtysix year old Dinnerstein was diagnosed as having Alzheimer's disease, an incurable condition
that destroys brain tissue. Id. at 467, 380 N.E.2d at 134. At the time of the trial, the patient
was in a vegetative state, immobile, speechless and unable to swallow without choking. Her life
expectancy was no more than a year. Id. at 468, 380 N.E.2d at 135. Due to her condition, the
treating physician anticipated cardiac or respiratory arrest at any time. The physician sought
court approval of his recommendation that resuscitation efforts not be taken in the event of
cardiac or respiratory arrest. Id. The court found that the question was entirely within the
competence of the treating physician and it could not be answered by judicial decision. Id. at
475, 380 N.E.2d at 139.
56. See In Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982); In re Spring, 380
Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
57. Compare In Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982) (requiring
judicial intervention where no family members are available for consultation) with Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (requiring
court participation where patient was never able to express his preference for life or death).
58. Whether a living will is "valid" depends upon statutory requirements in those states
with Natural Death Acts. See infra notes 173-76 and accompanying text. In Florida, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal has asserted that a valid living will is one executed by a mentally
sound patient, and duly proved by at least one disinterested witness. J.F.K. Mem. Hosp. Inc. v.
Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611, 620 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
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lated his desires, Massachusetts' rationale would not mandate judicial intervention in the decision to terminate treatment. Other states
addressing the matter of substituted judgment have likewise determined that judicial intervention is not required. 9 Though the states'
highest courts have yet to confront a petition for implementation of a
living will, 0 two states have rendered decisions in closely analogous
situations.
C. Personal Determination Without Judicial Intervention
In In re Storar,6 ' New York's highest court considered how an
incompetent with a known natural death desire could implement his
right to privacy. While in surgery, Brother Joseph Fox suffered cardiac arrest resulting in permanent brain damage.2 Previously,
Brother Fox had participated in formal discussions regarding the official position of the Roman Catholic Church on the moral implications of the Quinlan decision. The discussions revealed that the
Church approved of terminating extraordinary life-support systems
when no reasonable hope of recovery existed.14 Brother Fox agreed
with Church officials and unequivocally stated that he would not
want extraordinary means used to prolong his life.6

5

He reiterated

this desire while competent less than two months before his final
hospitalization. 6
Faced with a petition to remove Brother Fox's life-support system, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York held
59. See infra note 165.
60. The Florida Supreme Court has accepted certiorari in the living will case of J.F.K.
Mem. Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983). See infra text accompanying
notes 99-121.
61. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981), modifying Eichner v. Dillon,
73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980).
62. Storar, at 371, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269. Brother Fox lost the ability to
breathe spontaneously and doctors placed him on a respirator which maintained him in a vegetative state. Id.
63. Id. at 372, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
64. Id. The Vatican issued formal declarations in 1957, wherein Pope Pius XII stressed
that no obligation exists for an individual to use extraordinary means to prolong life. Though
finding it incumbent that the physician take all ordinary means to restore vital functions and
consciousness, the Pope stated that "it is not obligatory, however, to continue to use extraordinary means indefinitely in hopeless cases, but normally one is held to use only ordinary means
* * * that do not involve any grave burden for oneself or another. There comes a time when
resuscitative efforts should stop and death be unopposed." Pope Pius XII, Prolongation of Life,
4 AM. Q. PAPAL DoCmiNE 393 (1958). More recent statements express the same opinion: "When
inevitable death is imminent in spite of the means used, it is permitted in conscience to take
the decision to refuse forms of treatment that would only secure a precarious and burdensome
prolongation of life ...
." Vatican's Declaration on Euthanasia, May 5, 1980, at 8.
65. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 372, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
66. Id.
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that Brother Fox had a constitutional right to discontinue use of extraordinary medical treatment.6 7 The court followed the Saikewicz
approach requiring judicial approval before that right could be exercised. 8 The court also established an elaborate procedure to be followed by medical personnel, family members, and the judiciary
before allowing termination of treatment. 9
On appeal, the New York Supreme Court reversed this requirement of judicial intervention.7 ° The court concluded that Brother
Fox had a common law right to determine what to do with his body
which could not be forfeited upon his losing competency. 1 Furthermore, the court refused to address the contention that this right was
personal and could not be exercised by a third party after the patient
became incompetent. 72 Based on statements made prior to his incompetency, the court recognized that Brother Fox made the decision for
himself.73 According to the court, Brother Fox had carefully reflected
on the subject and expressed his desire not to prolong his life by
medical means if he became terminally ill.74 Based on this clear ex-

pression of intent 7 5 the New York court held that Brother Fox's directive could be implemented without prior court assessment. 6
In a similar situation, the Florida Supreme Court agreed that a
competent terminally ill adult has the right to halt life-prolonging
treatment. In Satz v. Perlmutter,8 the patient sought judicial ap67. Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), modified, In re Storar, 52
N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
68. Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 459, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 539 (1980).
69. Id. at 476-77, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 550. According to the court, the attending physician
must first certify that the patient is terminally ill and comatose. Thereafter, someone close to
the patient must present the prognosis to a hospital committee for confirmation. Upon confirmation, the patient's representative must apply to the court for appointment as "the committee
of the incompetent." The district attorney must then receive notice. Additionally, a guardian
ad litem must be appointed to assure the patient's protection by a neutral party. Id.
70. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 372, 420 N.E.2d at 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
71. Id. at 378-79, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
72. Id. at 378-79, 420 N.E.2d at 71-72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
73. Id.
74. Id. The court noted that Brother Fox's iterated desires were "obviously solemn pronouncements and not casual remarks." Id. Cf. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
75. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 379, 420 N.E.2d 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274. Most courts considering
termination of medical treatment have utilized a clear and convincing evidentiary standard
forbidding relief whenever evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory. See, e.g., Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 12, 426 N.E.2d 809, 816 (Ct. C.P., Prob. Div. 1980)
(allowing removal of a respirator from a terminally in incompetent upon clear and convincing
evidence that patient would desire such action).
76. Id. at 383, 420 N.E.2d at 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
77. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (4th D.C.A. 1978), affl'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
78. Id. Perlmutterhas received widespread discussion and analysis. See Note, In re Living Will, 5 NOVA L. Rav. 445 (1981); Comment, Florida'sRight to Die, supra note 30; Comment, Who Will Decide When a PatientMay Die?, 32 U. FLA. L. Rav. 808 (1981); Comment,

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol36/iss1/5

12

Stratos: Equal but Incompetant: Procedural Implementation of a Terminally
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. XXXVI

proval of his decision to discontinue extraordinary medical treat-

ment. 79 Seventy-three

year old Perlmutter suffered from Lou

disease,80

Gerhig's
an incurable condition with a life-expectancy of
two years from the time of diagnosis. 81 In great pain and with only
months left to live, Per]mutter petitioned the circuit court for removal of the mechanical respirator attached to his trachea.8 2 Fully
competent and aware that removal of the respirator would reduce his
life-expectancy to less than an hour,83 Perlmutter testified at a bedside hearing that "[death] can't be worse than what I'm going
through now.'' 4

Adopting the reasoning of Quinlan, the trial court acknowledged
that the constitutional right of privacy encompassed the right to decline medical treatment.85 Because he was competent and could make
an informed decision, the court found Perlmutter's right to privacy
even more compelling than Quinlan's right.86 The court concluded
that the interests of the state,87 the medical profession, 8 and third
parties 9 did not outweigh Perlmutter's right to natural death.
Affirming the trial court, 90 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
allowed termination and elaborated on the lower court's analysis of
valid state interests."1 Following the Saikewicz rationale, the court
recognized four specific state interests that might outweigh a terminally ill patient's right to die. These interests include preserving life,
protecting innocent third parties, preventing suicide, and maintaining the medical profession's ethical integrity.92 The court concluded
these interests did not preclude Perlmutter from refusing medical
Satz v. Permutter: A ConstitutionalRight to Die?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 377 (1981).
79. Extraordinary treatment iscommonly defined as "all medicines, treatments and oper-

ations which can not be obtained or used without excessive expense, pain, or other inconvenience, or which, if used, would not offer a reasonable hope of benefit." Louisell, Euthanasia
and Biathanasia:On Dying and Killing, 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 723, 736 (1973).
80. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 161 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1978). Amytrophic lateral sclerosis,
commonly known as Lou Gehrig's disease, is a degenerative condition of the neurological system causing paralysis and eventually death. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. On several occasions, Perlmutter had attempted to remove the respirator, but hospital personnel were notified by an alarm and prevented his actions. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 161.
85. Perlmutter v. Florida Med. Center, 47 Fla. Supp. 190, 194 (Broward County Cir. Ct.
1978).
86. Id. at 193.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 127-30.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 137-50.
89. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
90. Perlmutter,362 So. 2d 160 (4th D.C.A. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
91. Id. at 162. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
92. Id.
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treatment.9 3 Rather, the district court agreed with Saikewicz," and
distinguished the state's interest in saving human life from that of
merely extending the life of a terminally ill patient.9 5 On certiorari,
the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Perlmutter" and expressly
adopted the district court opinion.9 7 The court, however, confined its
decision to the instant facts, leaving complex legal, medical, and social issues unanswered pending legislative action. 8

D. The Written Directive-An Incompetent's Personal Choice
Florida recently confronted a case of first impression concerning
implementation of a living will in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Bludworth.ee Several of the previously discussed decisions involving terminally ill incompetents have dealt with substituted judgment, where the incompetent's desire to live or die was discernable
10 0
only through the opinion of someone close to the dying patient.
Unlike those cases, the desires of the incompetent terminally ill patient in J.F.K. Memorial Hospitalwas clearly articulated in his living
will. 10 1 This duly executed living will expressed Frances B. Landy's
directive that his life not be prolonged by artificial means, °2 and that
93. Id.
94. Id. at 162. When treatment is lifesaving as distinct from life prolonging, the state's
interest in the preservation of life prevails. See In re President & Dir. of Georgetown CoL, 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). This interest weakens, however, in
situations where continued treatment serves only to prolong a life inflicted with incurable conditions. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 41, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.. 922 (1976).
95. Perlmutter,362 So. 2d at 162.
96. Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
97. Id. at 360.
98. Id. Cf. Dade Cty. Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969).
There, the Florida Supreme Court urged the legislature to enact standards for implementing a
newly acknowledged right for teachers collectively bargaining. After four years of legislative
inaction, the Teachers' Association petitioned the court to appoint a commission to recommend
bargaining guidelines. Dade Cty. Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684 (Fla.
1972). The court refused to make such an appointment unless the legislature refused to act
within a reasonable time. Id. at 688. In 1973, when the Legislature again refused to act, the
court stepped in and appointed a commission. Finally, six years after judicial recognition of this
right, the legislature implemented an appropriate provision. See McHugh, The Florida Experience in Public Employee Collective Bargaining,1974-1978: Bellwether for the South, 1 FLA.
ST. U.L. REv. 263 (1978). See also supra note 30, at 104.
99. 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th D.C.A 1983). Research has revealed no other reported case
concerning implementation of a living will.
100. Assertion of an individual's desire in a valid living will avoids hearsay problems and
is therefore more indicative of that person's choice than ascertainment through substituted
judgment.
101. "Patient's Instructions to Physicians and Medical Care Provider to Terminate Medical Treatment," Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit 1 (Apr. 16, 1975) at 3.
102. Id. Landy's will fails to define "artificial means." It therefore may be interpreted to
request that no medical procedures be undertaken, whether classified as extraordinary or routine. Arguably, the language could be interpreted to prohibit any medical treatment and to
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he be allowed to die without pain and with dignity.1 03
While hospitalized, Landy became terminally ill and lapsed into a
comma. 10 4 As soon as Landy was placed on a mechanical respirator, 10 5
Mrs. Landy presented the treating physician with a copy of his living
will. 0 6 Though Mrs. Landy continually urged the physician to remove artificial life-support in accordance with her husband's directive, her pleas were refused. 10 7 In view of potential civil' 08 and criminal' 09 liability, the hospital and doctor filed an action seeking
declaratory relief.110 Landy died before this request was examined."'
Because the hospital is regularly requested to remove life support
systems," 2 the action was continued to obtain judicial guidance."'
The hospital contended that court approval was unnecessary for the
removal of extraordinary support systems from a terminally ill patient. 11 4 Unpersuaded, the trial court held that a guardian must be
appointed and a court order obtained before relief from liability
allow only the administration of drugs which would hasten death. See Answer Brief of Respondent at 2, 6, J.F.K. Mem. Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, however, defined "life sustaining procedures" and
evidently held Landy's words to evince the same meaning. See 432 So. 2d at 619.
103. Though Mr. Landy was comatose, evidence indicated that he was experiencing pain.
His treating physician testified as to the "irritating" and "damaging" nature of placing a tube
down his throat. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 2, J.F.K. Mem. Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432
So. 2d (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
104. 432 So. 2d at 613-14.
105. At the time physicians placed Landy on the respirator, his heart was malfunctioning,
his lungs were filled with fluid, and he had chronic interstitial fibrosis and gastrointestinal
bleeding. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 2, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
106. 432 So. 2d at 614.
107. Id.
108. The doctrine of informed consent mandates that physicians obtain the patient's consent to any treatment prior to its administration. See Meisel, The Expansion of Liability for
Medical Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56 Nm.
L. REv. 51 (1977); Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a
Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 413.
109. Though commentators have written much about the criminal consequences of passive euthanasia, no case involving a physician's termination of a terminally ill's life-prolonging
treatment has gone to trial. Collester, supra note 2, at 310. But see id. at 312-22 (discussing
criminal liability in the case of active euthanasia).
110. 432 So. 2d at 614.
111. Id.
112. At trial, the hospital's administrator testified that relatives of terminally ill patients
frequently requested the removal of life sustaining treatment. In response, the hospital always
required a court order authorizing removal, but in every case the patient expired prior to securing the order. Main Brief of Appellants, at 6, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983) (emphasis
added). At the time of trial, forty terminally ill incompetent patients remained at the hospital.
432 So. 2d at 614.
113. 432 So. 2d at 614. The trial court correctly held that since the controversy was one
likely to recur yet again evade review, the issue presented was justiciable. Id. See, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973); Times Pub. Co. v. Burke, 375 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1979).
114. 432 So. 2d at 614.
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would be granted for removing the life-support system. 111
In affirming the trial court's judgment, the Fourth District Court
of Appeal specifically recognized Landy's constitutionally protected
right to discontinue life-prolonging treatment. 1 6 In determining the
proper procedure to best implement this right, the court distinguished its earlier holding in Perlmutter."- The majority asserted

that in Perlmutter, the patient himself directly benefited from his
death with dignity request, while in J.F.K. Memorial Hospital, the
direct beneficiaries were Landy's family members. 1 8 As a result of of
this distinction, the court shifted its focus from safeguarding state
interests to protecting the interests of the terminally ill comatose individual." Consequently, the district court held that implementation
of a comatose individual's right to terminate medical treatment required judicial review.120 Finally, the court certified the question to
2
the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public interest.1 '
I1. JumCIL ENCROACHMENT-FLORIDA'S NON-COMPELLING INVASION
OF INCOMPETENTS' RIGHTS

All states addressing the issue clearly find that a competent or
incompetent terminally ill adult has a constitutional right to refuse
or discontinue extraordinary medical treatment. 122 The question of
115. Id. at 611.
116. Id. at 618-19.
117. Id. at 617-18.
118. Id. at 618. In Perlmutter, according to the court, "there was a present expressed
intent by a mentally incompetent individual to be allowed to die with dignity. The individual
himself was the direct beneficiary of the request and the benefit was cessation of pain and
suffering." Id. In J.F.K. Memorial Hospital, the court assumed, philosophical considerations
aside, that "in the case of a comatose individual there is no pain and suffering." Id. The court
reasoned that the direct benefits of termination in such a case were "financial savings and
cessation of emotional drain," with the beneficiaries being family members and not the patient
himself. Id. But see supra note 103. See also Page, The Pain of Terminal Illness and Bereavment and Approaches to It, 28 Cmrr. Am J. MA. 257-61 (1982) (discussing pain suffered by
terminally ill patients, including comatose individuals).
119. 432 So. 2d at 618.
120. Id. at 619
121. Id. at 620. The court asked:
In the case of a comatose and terminally ill individual who has executed a so-called
"living" or "mercy" will, is it necessary that a court appointed guardian of his person
obtain the approval of a court of competent jurisdiction before terminating extraordinary
life support systems in order for consenting family members, the attending physicians,
and the hospital and its administrators to be relieved of civil and criminal liability.
Id. at 620.
122. Id. at 614. To date, only six states have addressed the question of mandatory treatment of a terminally ill incompetent. See Severns v. Wilmington Med. Center, 421 A.2d 1334
(DeL 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re
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whether this right encompasses freedom from judicial intrusion, however, is not as apparent and has been answered in the negative by one
court. 12 Though both competents and incompetents possess a constitutional privacy right, Florida law requires judicial intervention only
for incompetents.1 24 Gauged against standards set in United States
Supreme Court privacy decisions, 26 this mandatory judicial intervention is constitutionally suspect. State regulation of a patient's right to
die must be strictly justified by a compelling state interest. 26 Close
scrutiny of Florida's asserted state interests reveals their uncompelling nature in the case of terminally ill incompetents. Thus, despite
these state interests, judicial approval should not be required.
The Florida Supreme Court held the state's interest in saving
human life is distinct from an interest in temporarily prolonging a
terminally ill individual's nonproductive life.12 7 While the interest in
saving life is compelling, the compelling quality wanes as the patient's chances for recovery diminish. 2 Even fear of foul play fails to
justify the court's interference 129 since an expedited hearing brought
by a guardian would do little to uncover bad faith efforts to terminate an incompetent's treatment.'
Likewise, the state's interest in protecting third parties is not so
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981); Leach v. Arkron Gen. Med.
Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 49, 426 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio Com. Pls. 1981); In re Coyler, 99 Wash. 2d
114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
123. See J.F.K. Memorial Hospital, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983). In analyzing
decisions from the "only five states" that have addressed the issue, the J.F.K. Memorial Hospital court failed to note the most recent decision on the issue by Washington's Supreme Court.
In In re Coyler, the incompetent patient suffered massive brain damage and became comatose.
Like the courts before it, the Supreme Court of Washington recognized a patient's right to
determine his own medical destiny, stating that "the question is,. . .who may exercise an incompetent's right to refuse life sustaining treatment if no directive exists." In re Coyler, 99
Wash. 2d 114, 124, 660 P.2d 738, 744 (1983).
After comparing Quinlan and Saikewicz, the court opted for the Quinlan approach, holding that judicial intervention is not required in every decision involving withdrawal of lifesustaining medical treatment. Id. at 125-27, 660 P.2d at 744-46. Pointing out that Coyler had
been competent prior to her illness and that she had family members willing to attest to her
beliefs, the court rejected the Saikewicz approach, finding judicial involvement unresponsive
and cumbersome. Id. at 127, 660 P. 2d at 745-46. The decision, however, was expressly limited
to "the removal of life sustaining systems from an incurable patient," and did not encompass
the propriety of withdrawing curative treatment from an incompetent patient, even if that patient is terminally ill. Id. at 139, 660 P.2d at 751-52.
124. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (4th D.C.A. 1978), aft'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla.
1980). Cf. J.F.K. Mem. Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 16-33.
126. Id.
127. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (4th D.C.A. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla.
1980).
128. Id.
129. Contra, id. at 618.
130. See supra note 112.
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compelling as to justify a burdensome courtroom hearing. Where a
patient has executed a living will specifically asserting his right of
privacy, the state may not override this directive with a third party
protection claim.13 1 In cases such as J.F.K. MemorialHospital,where
no minor children need protection, the state cannot claim a compelling need for judicial intervention. 3 2
An interest in preventing suicide also fails to compel judicial intervention. Death resulting from failure to employ life-support systems on a terminally ill patient is death from natural causes. 13 3 A
patient resisting medical treatment is not intent on repudiating life,
but on avoiding a prolonged, undignified dying process. There is no
assault on the body or active destruction of life; natural processes are
simply allowed to run their course without artificial disruption.3 4
Since the patient neither sets the death process in motion nor desires
to die,13 5 the state's interest is minimal.
Finally, the state's interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of
the medical profession also falls short of compelling. Prevailing medical ethics do not require prolongation of life for a terminally ill comatose patient. 13 6 Indeed, institutional considerations weigh heavily
131. The state's interest in protection of third parties has prevailed over individual freedom of choice in medical consent cases when dependent children are involved. Where an adult's
refusal of treatment could impose a financial burden on society due to children who might
become wards of the state, the courts have usually interceded and ordered medical care. See In
re President & Dir. of Georgetown Col., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978
(1964). There, the court authorized a hospital to administer blood transfusions to a Jehovah's
Witness who had a seven-month-old son but was unwilling to consent to treatment. Id. at 1006.
Judge Skelly Wright discussed valid state considerations concerning loss of parental care, guidance, and a duty to the community to care for small children. Id. at 1008.
132. When no burden will be placed upon the state to care for dependents, an adult's
decision to refuse medical treatment is almost always sanctioned by the court when challenged.
See A. HOLDER, MEDIcAL MALPRACTiCE LAw 16, 36 (1975); but see John F. Kennedy Mem.
Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
133. Perlmutter,362 So. 2d at 162.
134. In 1974, testimony before a Senate Subcommittee pointed out that "about 3/4 of
American physicians say they practice 'passive' euthanasia regularly-that is, the withdrawal of
artificial life support and permit dying." Medical Ethics: The Right to Survival: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Health of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93 Cong., 2d
Sess. 9 (1974).
135. Though the patient "consents" to death by choosing to cease life-prolonging treatment, he does not choose to be terminally ill. At least one author alleges that in the case of
brain-stem-damage patients, physicians regularly practice involuntary passive euthanasia, in
which treatment is withheld without a patient's consent, though this arguably constitutes culpable homicide. See Note, supra note 4, at 1277.
136. Almost all authority is in agreement that prolongation of life is not always desirable.
See, e.g., Baron, Assuring "Detachedbut PassionateInvestigation and Decision": The Role of
GuardiansAd Litum in Saikewicz-type Cases, 4 AM. J.L. & MaD. 111 (1978); Baron, Medical
Paternalism and the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr. Relman, 4 Am. J.L. & MED. 337 (1979);
Buchanan, Medical Paternalismor Legal Imperialism: Not the Only Alternatives for Handling Saikewicz-type Cases, 5 AM. J.L. MED. 97 (1979). See also Gold, Wiser than the Laws?:
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against preserving an incapacitated individual's life against his
will.137

Though physicians have traditionally been responsible for de-

termining the nature, extent, and duration of medical treatment,13 8
the physician's duty to cure or prevent disease does not mandate unnecessary prolongation of life.139 No categorical imperative exists
which requires doctors to aggressively treat all terminal illness;
rather, doctors must weigh treatment benefits against disadvantages
to the patient. 140 Routine judicialization of the physician-patient relationship is not only unconstitutionally burdensome, but may also
be counterproductive for at least two reasons.
First, the shifting and subtle complexities of clinical situations
make a courtroom decision impractical.' 4 ' A patient's medical condition often changes so quickly that emergency medical decisions cannot wait for even an expedited judicial hearing. 1 42 The courts cannot
be expected to exercise sound medical judgment, nor can they act
promptly and flexibly to meet rapidly changing medical needs. 43
Secondly, imposing expensive, mandatory judicial proceedings
The Legal Accountability of the Medical Profession, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 145 (1981).
137. Indefinite maintenance of terminally ill incompetents could easily over-tax hospital
facilities, thereby depriving patients with better prognoses from obtaining intensive care.
Hirsch & Donovan, The Right to Die: Medico-Legal Implications of In re Quinlan, 30 RUTGERS
L. REv. 267, 297 (1977). Furthermore, the economical cost of sustaining some terminally ill
incompetents may be too straining on society's limited resources. See Death with Dignity: An
Inquiry into Related Public Issues; HearingsBefore the Special Comm. on Aging, U.S. Senate,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1972) (statement of Dr. Walter W. Sackett, member Florida House of
Representatives). Dr. Sackett testified before the committee concerning Florida's 1500 severely
retarded patients:
According to present-day cost and the fact that you can keep these individuals alive
artificially to between [ages] 50 to 60, it's going to cost the State of Florida for 50 years
$5 billion. . . .Translated roughly this means it's going to cost the various States over
this same period over $100 billion ...
Id. at 30.
138. See generally Zimring, supra note 4, at 951.
139. See generally Zimring, When is the Physician Playing God?, 28 T.A. GERIATRIC Soc.
419 (1980).
140. See, e.g., Am. Med. News, July 26, 1976, at 11, col. 1, discussing the Saikewicz case.
At trial, a cancer specialist testified that the proper course to take in regards to chemotherapy
administration was not clear-cut since the treatment, if successful, would only temporarily arrest the disease. Moreover, the treatment's side effects include vomiting and nausea, bladder
irritation, and numbness of the extremities. Id.
141. See Relman, supra note 53, at 240.
142. Id.
143. Id. An examination of medical litigation is exemplary. In Eichner v. Dillon, 73
A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), modified, In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981), the lower court took almost two years to decide the case. A year before it
reached its decision, the patient died of congestive heart failure despite the assistance of a
respirator. Similarly, a final decision in In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980),
required almost two years and again the patient died prior to its issuance due to a disease not
associated with his terminal condition.
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may lead to "closet" 1 4 decisions in incompetent terminally in cases.
Though the number of potential cases involving life-prolonging decisions is huge, 14 5 few have reached the courts. The lack of judicial
guidance has caused widespread confusion in the medical profession.
As a consequence many physicians may choose either to prolong life
irrespective of the patient's desire, or to closet decisions without discussion or legal approval.146 "No treatment" or "withdrawal of treatment" decisions are made constantly, but are rarely brought to judicial attention. 47 Neither relatives nor physicians want to undertake
the trouble or expense of obtaining judicial approval, particularly
when they have no guarantee the court's judgment will better reflect
the correct medical or ethical decision. A grieving family will likely
be hesitant to undergo an adversarial courtroom proceeding and the
treating physician may be hardpressed to enter the judicial arena due
to time restraints and economic considerations. 48
The state, too, will be overwhelmingly burdened by constant petitions to assert death with dignity. Unless additional staffing is allocated, prosecutors will be unable to perform in-depth investigations
for every case. Consequently, the judicial purpose of safeguarding
against foul play will be negated. Overall, physicians may perceive a
mandatory courtroom procedure as a confusing bureaucratic encroachment on their decisionmaking powers. 1 49 Thus, judgments previously made after full and explicit consultations will be made hastily
15 0
and even furtively, thereby eliminating fruitful discussion.
Although Florida explicitly recognizes an individual's right to privacy may be asserted in a natural death situation, it unnecessarily
forces judicial intervention in the case of a terminally ill incompetent. This is true even if the incompetent's choice is clearly ascertainable through a living will. 151 Such a procedure obliterates the incompetent's panoply of rights merely because the patient can no longer
sense the violation of those rights.152 Rather, a competent, terminally
ill person should be able to choose to terminate treatment and have
that choice honored even if he later becomes incompetent. 5 3
144. See Relman, supra note 43, at 241.
145. See, e.g., supra note 112.
146. See Relman, supra note 43, at 241; but see Hudson, Medical Ethics After Quinlan,
J. KAN. MED.Soc. May 1983, at 371.
147. See supra note 2.
148. See generally Cameron, Terminal Care: Evaluation of Effects on Surviving Family
of Care Before and After Bereavement, 59 POSTGRAD. MED. J. 73-78 (1983).
149. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 52.
150. See Relman, supra note 1, at 509.
151. See J.F.K. Mem. Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla.4th D.C.A. 1983).
152. Note, supra note 2, at 251.
153. Id.
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Thus, Florida must act to guarantee that all its citizens, including
competents who later become incompetent, can assert their fundamental right to privacy in terminally ill situations. A procedure must
be devised to prevent the state from abridging its citizens' privacy
rights with routine judicial intervention. As noted by the Florida Supreme Court in Perlmutt.er, this issue, containing complex legal,
medical, and social values,15 4 is best addressed in a legislative forum
where factfinding is less confined and the interests of all parties are
considered.15 5 Recognizing this need for legislative action, numerous
states have enacted natural death statutes.1 6 Though Florida's legislature has considered the issue, it has failed over a dozen times to
157
adopt suitable legislation.
A. The Need For Judicial Action
Acknowledging the Florida legislature's failure to resolve the issue, the Perlmutter court held that preference for legislative treatment cannot shackle the courts when legally protected interests are
at stake. 158 Legislative inaction must not bar court access to citizens
who assert cognizable constitutional rights.'59 The Florida Supreme
Court will soon consider this issue of whether a terminally ill incompetent who previously executed a living will must obtain court approval before terminating extraordinary treatment. i 0
The Supreme Court should follow the lead of states that currently
have natural death statutes and permit implementation of an adult's
living will without an appointed guardian or court approval.' While
154. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d at 360.
155. Id.
156. States with Natural Death Acts include: Arkansas, California, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington.
157. Natural death bills were introduced in the Florida legislature every year from 1969
to 1982. See, e.g., FLA. H.R. 91 (1st Reg. Sess. 1969, introduced by Rep. Sackett); FLA. S. (Reg.
Sess. 1982, introduced by Rep. Childers). No bill was introduced in 1983.
158. Perlnutter,379 So. 2d at 360.
159. See supra note 98.
160. 432 So. 2d at 620. In 1980, lawmakers amended the Florida Constitution to establish
an individual right of privacy. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1980). Thus, Florida affirmed its belief
that the state should guarantee this broad and fundamental right to its citizens. The J.F.K.
Memorial Hospital majority recognized that this provision granted Florida citizens an explicit
privacy right. The court consequently felt "duty bound" to protect this right and the "concomitant right to die with dignity" by setting forth a lengthy and complex procedure. 432 So. 2d at
619-20.
161. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3801-04 (1981); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7185-95 (West
Cum. Supp. 1979-80); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 250-09 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 39-4501-08 (1982);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 101-109 (1980); NEV. REV. STATS. § 449.540-610 (1979); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 24-7.1-7,11 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90,320-23; OR. REv. STAT. §§ 87,050-141 (1981);
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon 1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5251-5262 (1983);
WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.010-.905 (1982).
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some statutes are elaborate16 2 and others are brief,163 all delienate
procedures that do not require routine judicial scrutinization.
These statutes recognize that individuals have a constitutional
right to control decisions relating to their medical care."6 Under
these statutes, family members, physicians, and hospitals that follow
the statutory procedures are relieved of any civil or criminal liability.
A majority of the states specify the language to be used in the individual's directive. 6 5 The directive must clearly show the declarant's
desire to avoid artificial, extraordinary, or extreme medical procedures calculated to prolong life.166
Each state legislature was undoubtedly cognizant of the state's interest in determining that a living will was actually executed by the
declarant while of sound mind. 6 7 Indeed, these legislative enact-

ments are drafted in contemplation of certain state interests. In considering the state interests, however, every state legislature determined that simple procedures ensured the trustworthiness of the
written directive, and they deemed court approval unnecessary.
B. Implementation Without Intervention-Model Guidelines
Guided by the living will statutes of other states, Florida should
162. See, e.g., CAL. HWmTH & SAFEY CODE §§ 7185-95 (West. Cum. Supp. 1979-80). California was the first state to enact natural death laws.
163. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3802 (1981).
164. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502(a) (1982) stating: "An individual, legally
adult who is competent and of sound mind, has the right to refuse medical or surgical treatment.... ." Id.
165. States which specify directive language include: California, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon,
and Texas. Virginia suggests a format, but does not make it mandatory.
166. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3802 (1981).
167. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-3 (1978), stating.
A. An individual of sound mind and having reached the age of majority may execute
a document directing that if he is ever certified under the Right to Die Act (N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 24-7-1 to 24-7-11 (1978)) as suffering from a terminal illness then maintenance
medical treatment shall not be utilized for the prolongation of his life.
B. A document described in Subsection A of this section is not valid unless it has
been executed with the same formalities as required of a valid will pursuant to the provisions of the Probate Code.
Id. At least ten states require that the declarant be an adult of sound mind. These states are
Alaska, California, Delaware, Washington, D.C., Illinois, Kansas, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas,
Vermont and Washington. Arkansas and New Mexico permit another to execute the directive
on behalf of a minor. Arkansas permits the directive to be made by another on behalf of those
who are unable to do so because they are physically or mentally unable. North Carolina allows
any declarant of sound mind to execute the directive, regardless of age. Idaho requires that the
declarant be a "qualified patient, a person of sound mind at least eighteen (18) years of age
diagnosed by the attending physician to be afiicted with a terminal condition." IDAHo CODE §
39-4503 (1982).
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authorize a procedure following these basic guidelines:1 8
1) An adult patient must execute a living will directing that
his or her life not be prolonged by life-sustaining procedures.
2) The living will must be signed in the presence of two witnesses. Each witness must certify in writing that the witness
believes the declarant to be of sound mind and the declarant
understands the effect of such directive, and that the witness:
a) is not related to the declarant or to the declarant's
spouse. b) does not 'know or have a reasonable expectation that the witness would be entitled to any portion of
the estate of the declarant upon his or her death under
any will of the declarant or codicil or under Florida's intestate succession statute. c) is not the attending physician or an employee of the attending physician, or an employee of a health facility in which the declarant is a
patient, or an employee of a nursing home or any group
care home in which the declarant resides, and d) does not
have a claim against any portion of the declarant's estate
at the time of the declaration.
3) Each witness shall sign his or her certification in the presence of a notary public. 4) The attending physician must certify that the patient will remain terminally ill, regardless of
the utilization of life-sustaining procedures. This prognosis
must be confirmed by a consulting physician, other than the
attending physician, who has examined the patient. 6 " 5) The
living will may be revoked by the declarant in any manner by
which he or she is able to communicate the intent to revoke,
without regard to his or her mental or physical condition.
Such revocation shall become effective only upon communication to the attending physician by the declarant or by an individual acting on behalf of the declarant. 170 6) The withholding
168. These guidelines are suggested in Petitioner's Brief on the Mertis (filed in the Florida Supreme Court) at -, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
169. According to the J.F.K. Memorial Hospital court, certification requires that the patient has been diagnosed and certified in writing to be in terminal condition and that the prospects of regaining cognitive brain function are extremely remote. 432 So. 2d at 619.
Life sustaining procedures are medical procedures which utilize mechanical means to
sustain, restore, or supplant a vital function, which serves only or primarily to prolong
the movement of death, and where, in the judgment of the attending and consulting
physicians as reflected in the patient's medical records, death is imminent if such procedures are not utilized.
170. Allowing revocation at any time and in any manner prevents a patient from being
unwillingly bound by his right to die assertion. Recognizing valid effectuation of this right only
upon communication to the attending physician protects medical personnel from later charges
of civil or criminal liability. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189 (West Cum. Supp.
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or discontinuance of life-sustaining procedures in accordance
with good faith compliance with these conditions shall not be
considered the cause of death for any civil or criminal purposes and shall be a defense against any criminal or civil action asserted for compliance with those conditions.17 1
By implementing a procedure following the guidelines stated
above, the Florida Supreme Court can assure Florida citizens that
their privacy rights will be protected should they become incompetent."2 While these procedural suggestions are not flawless, no single
set of guidelines, moral, legal or medical, can be fashioned to resolve
the infinite range of ethical considerations inherent in the physiology
of dying. Rather, their purpose is to provide a minimum guarantee
that Florida will protect an incompetent's constitutional right to
make autonomous medical decisions, irrespective of legislative
inaction.
Eight years have passed since Karen Quinlan slipped into a coma,
yet an incompetent's constitutional right to die remains unsecured in
Florida. 17 8 Consequently, the right of a terminally ill incompetent to
avoid artificial prolongation of life through execution of a written directive is uncertain. While this complex issue is more suitably addressed in a legislative forum, the court cannot wait for statutory
provisions before it acts to vindicate constitutionally protected rights.
The court must protect an incompetent patient's right of self-determination by promulgating procedural guidelines which do not require
judicial intervention.
No state interest exists to compel judicial encroachment on medical decisionmaking and individual autonomy. Ironically, this judicial
overview procedure actually abridges the privacy rights of the very
incompetents it purports to protect. Rather than safeguarding life,
these procedures disregard an incompetent's directive and unduly
prolong a possibly painful wait for death. The Florida Supreme Court
should enforce the constitutional rights of incompetents and articulate a procedure that does not abrogate an individual's right to
choose between life without consciousness or death with dignity.
1979-80). For an analysis of this and other provisions of the California Code, see generally,
Note, The California Natural Death Act: An Empirical Study of Physician's Practices, 31
STAN. L. REv. 913 (1979).
171. See, e.g., Dmr. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 2505 (1982). This Delaware section relieves medical personnel of liability and further allows a physician or nurse to assume that an individual
executing a directive was of sound mind unless actual notice indicates otherwise. Id.
172.

FLA. CONsT. art. I,

§ 23.

173. Perlmutter,379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980). Since the supreme court limited its statement
to the instant facts, the scope of the terminally ill's right to die is uncertain. Id.
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IV.

EPILOGUE

JUDICIAL AFFIRMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT OF A RIGHT TO

DIE FOR BOTH COMPETENT AND INCOMPETENT ADULTS

Immediately prior to the publication of this issue, the Florida Supreme Court in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Bludworth'
unequivocally acknowledged the right of all terminally in individuals
to avoid extraordinary medical treatment when on the threshold of
death.2 Citing Perlmutters Quinlan,' and Saikewicz, 5 the court recognized that dying patients have the right to refuse extraordinary
medical treatment, and concluded that a means must exist to allow
assertion of this right. Utilization of mandatory court approval to effectuate this right, however, was deemed to be unnecessary for protection of state or patient interest.' Though not required in every
case, the court noted that judicial review would be available in cases
where doubt existed or where there was disagreement among the
family, physician, and hospital.
The supreme court next delineated specific requirements which
doctors and family members must follow before life-sustaining treatment may be legally withdrawn from a terminally ill incompetent."
Under this procedure the treating physician must certify that the patient is in a permanent vegetative state with no reasonable prospect
of regaining consciousness and that his existence is being sustained
only through the use of extraordinary life-sustaining treatment.' Ad1. 1984 Fla. L.W. 196 (Fla. May 25, 1984). Justice McDonald, concurring in result only,
suggests that the court's elaboration on factual situations not before it was unnecessary. Id.

2. At the time the court issued this decision, the "Life Prolonging Procedure Act," discussed infra, had passed through the Florida House of Representatives without debate and was
pending in the Florida Senate.
3. 362 So. 2d 160 (4th D.C.A. 1978), aff'd, 370 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980). See supra text
accompanying notes 77-98 for a discussion of Perlmutter.
4. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 657, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See supra notes 34-43 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Quinlan.
5. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 427 (1977). See supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Saikewicz.
6. 1984 Fla. L.W. at 197.
7. In support of this conclusion, the supreme court cited In re Guardianship of Barry, 445
So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1984). In Barry, parents petitioned the court to remove the life
support systems keeping their terminally ill comatose infant alive. Id. at 367. Affirming the trial
court's holding, the Second District Court of Appeal concluded that the interests of the child as
asserted through his parents outweighed any state interest in preservation of life. Id. at 370.
The district court, in dicta, pointed out that judicial review is not required in every case before
extraordinary treatment can be withheld from a terminally ill child. Id. at 371. Rather, a decision by parents supported by competent medical advice should sufficiently protect the child's
interest without mandatory judicial intervention. Id. at 372.
8. 1984 Fla. L.W.at 198.
9. Id.
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ditionally, two other physicians with specialties relevant to the patient's condition must concur with the treating physician's
certification. 10
Once these requirements are met, close family members or a
court-appointed guardian may, through their substituted judgment,
assert the terminally ill patient's right to die.1 According to the
court, if the patient had executed a living will while competent, then
that declaration would provide persuasive evidence of the patient's
intent and should be given great weight by persons utilizing substituted judgment on the incompetent's behalf.12 The court held that if
such procedures are followed in good faith, all involved parties are
relieved of potential civil and criminal liability.13
Florida's highest judicial branch thus provided a viable procedure
for implementing the constitutionally protected right to die. In so doing, the court appropriately laid to rest the previous inequitable differentiation between the rights of competent and incompetent terminally ill patients.1 ' The medical community can now, without
overriding fear of malpractice suits, withdraw medical treatment
from patients desirous of such action.
Still the opinion leaves gaps. Extraordinary life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn from a comatose patient, but no definition is
given to aid the physician in determining exactly what constitutes
such treatment. Thus, the medical profession remains without specifications and termination decisions may be inconsistently made. In
addition, no priority is delineated among family members and guardians in the event their substituted judgments differ as to the incompetent's desires.15
Most importantly, the opinion fails to ensure that the incompetent's intent as expressed through a living will is actually carried out.
The living will provides only "persuasive evidence" and no mandate
forces the person acting on behalf of the incompetent to seek withdrawal of treatment. Thus, incompetents are once again, to a lesser
degree, without the same assurance as competents that their expressed rights of privacy will be protected. Had the court spelled out
specific guidelines as suggested earlier in this note,16 an executed liv10. Id.
11. Id. See supra note 41 for an explanation of the substituted judgment doctrine.
12. 1984 Fla. L.W. at 198.
13. Id.
14. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 122-53.
15. The court does, however, specifically point out that the judiciary is always open to
hear such matters, and disagreement among physicians or family members may recognize judicial intervention upon the filing of an appropriate petition. 1984 Fla. L.W. at 198.
16. See supra text accompanying notes 168-71.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol36/iss1/5

26

Stratos: Equal but Incompetant: Procedural Implementation of a Terminally
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
[VOL lavi

ing will would provide moire than persuasive evidence and rightfully
place an individual's death decision under his sole determination.
Fortunately, most of these gaps were closed by the Florida legislature with the passage of the "Life-Prolonging Procedure Act of Florida." 117 Enacted only days after the supreme court's J.F.K. Memorial
Hospital decision, the Act expressly recognizes the right of a competent terminally ill adult to have life-prolonging procedures withdrawn
or withheld by executing an oral or written declaration or by
designating another to make the treatment decision. 18 The statute
specifically defines life-prolonging procedures19 as well as terminal
condition.20 The Act also sets out the proper procedures for executing
a legally binding directive and mandates that such directive become
part of the patient's medical records.2 1 A suggested declaration form
is given, but need not be specifically followed, and oral, physical and
written revocation procedures are specified.2 2 If a terminally ill comatose individual has failed to execute a declaration, the statute provides that the physician and any of several specified individuals may
confer and determine the patient's desire.23 A list of individuals who
may act on the 4incompetent's behalf is specifically delineated in or2
der of priority.
Reaching further than. the judiciary, the legislature laudably
makes mandatory the implementation of a properly executed living
will. Any physician who refuses to comply with a patient's directive
must make a reasonable effort to transfer the patient to another physician.2 Additionally, the Act makes concealment, cancellation or falsification of another's declaration a third degree felony.2 If, however,
17. 1984 FI. Laws c. 58 (effective May 30, 1984).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 3(3) defines "life-prolonging" procedure as:
[A]ny medical procedure, treatment or intervention which. (a) utilizes mechanical or
other artificial means to sustain, restore, or supplant a spontaneous vital function; and
(b) when applied to a patient in a terminal condition would serve only to prolong the
dying process.
Life-prolonging procedure shall not include the provision of sustenance or the ad-

ministration of medication or performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary
to provide comfort, care or alleviate pain.

Id.
20. Id. § 3(6) defines "terminal condition" as "a condition caused by injury, disease, or
illness from which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, there can be no recovery and
death is imminent." Id.
21.

See id.

§

4.

22. See id.
23. Id. §7.

§8 5, 6.

24.

§

See id.

25. Id.
26. Id.

7(a)-(f).

8.
110. In order to be punished under this section and as provided in FLA.
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all persons involved in terminating the treatment act in good faith,
they shall be relieved of any criminal or civil liability.2 7 Moreover, an
apparently valid declaration is presumed to be voluntary, thereby alleviating the need for probate-like proceedings. 28
As with any new statute, the Act contains certain ambiguities
which must be resolved through time and interpretation. On the one
hand, the Act appears to go even further than the supreme court's
opinion in protecting the rights of both competents and incompetents
by making the implementation of a living will mandatory. In addition, the expressed intent of a terminally ill patient who later becomes incompetent cannot be overruled by another's substituted
judgment. On the other hand, three classes of patients who received
implicit protection under J.F.K. Memorial Hospital, those pregnant,
underage, and non-imminently terminal, are expressly excluded from
the Florida Act's purview.
The Act states that the termination decision of an otherwise
"qualified patient"29 diagnosed as pregnant shall have no effect during the course of pregnancy. Such a provision is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's holding in Roe, since during the first trimester of
pregnancy, a woman's privacy interest outweighs all state interests in
the life of a fetus. 80 Thus a terminally ill female in the early stages of
pregnancy should be allowed the same right to avoid prolongation of
death as nonpregnant individuals. Furthermore, this provision in effect revives the differential rights of competents and incompetents. If
a terminally ill pregnant patient in her first trimester is conscious,
she may terminate her pregnancy and thereaffer effectuate her living
will. Regardless of her desire, however, a similarly situated pregnant
patient who is unconscious is unable to take such action to carry out
her right to a natural death.
Likewise, the Act provides that only adults may execute living
wills,8 1 yet the statute's substituted judgment procedures are inapplicable to minors.3 2 Though preventing automatic implementation of a
minor's living will seems appropriate for the same policy reasons that
775.082, .083 or .084, the person tampering with the declaration must have caused actual contravention of the patient's intent either by causing him a prolonged life when he preferred
death or death when he preferred life-prolongation.
27. 1984 Fla. Laws c. 58, § 9(1), (2).
28. Id.
29. The Act defines a qualified patient as one who has made a declaration in accordance
with this Act and been diagnosed and certified in writing by the attending physician, and by
one other physician who has examined the patient, to be afflicted with a terminal condition.
1984 Fla. Laws c. 58, § 3(5).
30. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
31. 1984 Fla. Laws c. 58, § 4(1).
32. Id. § 7(1).
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prevent numerous other rights from vesting in non-adults, the statute's designation of substituted judgment procedures solely for adult
patients is problematic. If applied to children, the procedures would
provide adequate safeguards by requiring a witnessed consultation
and decision by the parent in conjunction with the attending
physician."3
Less explicitly, the statute's definition of "terminal condition" includes the requirement that death is imminent, but fails to indicate
whether this qualification means imminent death with or without the
use of life-support systems. If a narrow interpretation of this requirement is applied, a person in a permanent vegatative state whose life
can be prolonged indefinitely through artificial treatment may be exluded from those patients who possess a statutory right to die.
Resolution of this ambiguity between judicial and legislative classification of those possessing a right to die is made even more difficult by the following section 4 which states: "provisions of the Act are
cumulative with existing law. . . and shall not impair any rights or
responsibilities. . ." which doctors, patients, whether minor or incompetent, or family members may have in regard to withdrawal of
life-prolonging procedures under the common law. Thus, under this
section, pregnant females, minors, and persons in a permanent vegetative state" might still assert their right, as elucidated by the judiciary, to have life-prolonging treatment withheld without prior court
approval.3 6
A fuller analysis of the interplay between the statute and the supreme court's holding is difficult as both actions are so recent. No
doubt they will spawn litigation, particularly since the supreme
court's opinion appears to recognize constitutional rights which the
legislature's action immediately dissolves. While the supreme court's
broad coverage may be preferable, the statute's explicit procedures
are indispensable. Though the parameters are not yet clear, both the
Florida Supreme Court and the Florida legislature should be applauded for independently acting to assure protection of their citizens' constitutional right to avoid life-prolonging pain.
KIMARIE R. STRATOS
33. See id. § 7(1)-(3). Interestingly, this section requires only the attending physician, in
coordination with the patient's representative to certify in writing that the withdrawal decision
was made. Section 7(2) provides that this consultation be made in the presence of two witnesses, but no other physician is required to double check the attending physician's diagnosis,
as is the case when effectuating a written declaration according to § 3(5) and (8).
34. Id. § 13.
35. See supra text accompanying note 33.
36. Since the Act does not take effect until Oct. 1, 1984, these classes must at least possess full rights under the court's opinion until that date.
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